We study a fractional counterpart of the on-line list colouring game "Mr. Paint and Mrs. Correct" introduced recently by Schauz. We answer positively a question of Zhu by proving that for any given graph the on-line choice ratio and the (off-line) choice ratio coincide. On the other hand it is known from the paper of Alon et al. that the choice ratio equals the fractional chromatic number. It was also shown that the limits used in the definitions of these last two notions can be realised. We show that this is not the case for the on-line choice ratio. Both our results are obtained by exploring the strong links between the on-line choice ratio, and a new on-line game with probabilistic flavour which we introduce.
Introduction
We start with a short introduction of the basic notions. Consider a finite and simple graph G = (V, E). A list assignment L is a function assigning a set L(v) to each vertex v ∈ V . We say that L is a-long if |L(v)| a for each vertex v ∈ V .
A function Φ assigning a subset Φ(v) ⊆ L(v) to each vertex v ∈ V is an (L, b)-colouring if the following conditions are met:
• ∀v ∈ V |Φ(v)| b,
• ∀(u, w) ∈ E Φ(u) ∩ Φ(w) = ∅. Following [1] we define the fractional chromatic number χ F (G) and the choice ratio ch F (G):
: G is (a, b)-colourable , the electronic journal of combinatorics 18 (2011), #P140
• ch F (G) = inf a b
: G is (a, b)-choosable .
Observe that the standard notions of chromatic number χ(G) and choice number ch(G) can be equivalently restated as follows:
• χ(G) = min {a : G is (a, 1)-colourable},
• ch(G) = min {a : G is (a, 1)-choosable}.
Fact 1.
The values of the infimum in the definitions of χ F (G) and ch F (G) are attained.
See [1] for a proof. As a consequence, the infimum can be replaced by the minimum in the definitions of χ F (G) and ch F (G).
The following inequalities between the four chromatic parameters follow directly from their definitions:
The game "Mr. Paint and Mrs. Correct", or PC-game for short, introduced recently by Shauz [2] , is a two player game. The game is played in rounds on a graph G = (V, E) which is known in advance to both players Mr. Paint and Mrs. Correct. Moreover, two parameters a and b are fixed in advance. At the very beginning each vertex v has an empty list L 0 (v) = ∅ assigned to it. These initially empty lists will eventually contain exactly a colours as Mr. Paint is going to fill the lists during the game. The goal of Mrs. Correct is to incrementally construct an (L, b)-colouring ϕ from the resulting list assignment. Mr. Paint, by smartly filling the lists L(v), tries to prevent the assignment ϕ, being built by Mrs. Correct, from resulting in the correct (L, b)-colouring. At the very beginning Mrs. Correct is forced to set ϕ 0 (v) = ∅ for all v ∈ V .
In the i-th round Mr. Paint chooses a nonempty subset of vertices P i ⊆ V and appends a new colour c i to the lists assigned to the vertices in P i so that:
It is forbidden for Mr. Paint to construct any lists having more than a elements. He instantly loses the game if he decides to break this rule. At this point Mrs. Correct chooses an independent subset C i ⊆ P i and assigns colour c i to the vertices in C i to get:
If after l rounds all the lists are full, i.e. |L l (v)| = a for every v ∈ V , the game ends, after Mrs. Corrects move. Mrs. (G) are defined as follows:
The following inequalities are straightforward:
Balanced Distribution Game
To understand better the possible strategies for Mr. Paint and for Mrs. Correct in the PC-games we introduce a new game. It is again a two person game, between Nominator and Distributor, and we call it the Balanced Distribution Game, or the BD-game for short. In this game, informally, Nominator constructs a sequence (N i ) of subsets of a set Π of participants -one subset at a time. Distributor consecutively assigns goods to the participants in the new subset N i . More precisely, he chooses a commodity δ i out of a finite set Γ of commodities, and then distribute only goods of this commodity to the participants in N i , one good for each of the participants. The number of goods of each commodity is unlimited. Distributor's goal is to ensure that at the end of the game each single participant got a well balanced spectrum of goods, that is, about equally many goods of each commodity.
In the preparatory phase of the game players establish some rules of the next phase of the game. Nominator chooses a finite set Π of participants and a finite set Γ of commodities of goods. Then he chooses a real number 0 ε < 1 -an acceptable deviation from the perfectly balanced distribution. Distributor responds by carefully picking a number k > 0. This number determines how many goods each of the participants will receive or, equivalently, how many times each participant will occur in the subsets N i constructed by Nominator.
After the preparatory phase the game is played in rounds. In the i-th round Nominator nominates a non-empty subset N i ⊆ Π. Sets presented by Nominator need not be pairwise different. Distributor responds by choosing any δ i ∈ Γ and by giving one good of the commodity δ i to each participant π ∈ N i . The following two parameters are necessary to determine the winner in the BD-game.
• occ i (π) = |{j : π ∈ N j and j i}| -the number of goods given to the participant π ∈ Π in the first i rounds, the electronic journal of combinatorics 18 (2011), #P140
• gds i (π, γ) = |{j : π ∈ N j and γ = δ j and j i}| -the number of goods of the commodity γ ∈ Γ given to the participant π ∈ Π in the first i rounds.
We will omit the subscripts and use the parameters occ (·) and gds (·, ·) which change their values as the game is played. Nominator is not allowed to construct sequences with occ (π) > k. He instantly loses the game if he decides to break this rule. The game actually ends when each of the participants from Π was nominated exactly k times, i.e. occ (π) = k for all π ∈ Π. As Nominator presents only non-empty subsets, the game comes to an end after at most k · |Π| rounds. Distributor wins if the inequality gds (π, γ) (1 − ε) k |Γ| holds for each π and γ. Otherwise Nominator wins.
We will also consider a variant of BD-game in which values of Π, Γ and ε are fixed instead of being chosen by Nominator. We will see that the most important parameter is ε and the situation splits dramatically between ε > 0 and ε = 0.
One of the natural strategies for Distributor is to choose k "big enough" and then pick each δ i "uniformly at random from Γ". We omit the somewhat troublesome details, as they will not be needed, and assure the reader that for ε > 0 this randomised strategy brings victory to Distributor with probability tending to 1 as k tends to infinity. The following lemma gives a straightforward derandomisation of this idea.
Lemma 2. In BD-games with ε > 0, Distributor has a winning strategy.
Proof. We describe a strategy that leads to the defeat of Nominator. In the preparatory phase Distributor, knowing Π, Γ and ε > 0, fixes an arbitrary numbering of Γ = {γ 0 , . . . , γ r−1 } and sets
In the i-th round, Distributor needs to select δ i for the participants in N i nominated by Nominator. If this is the first time the subset N i appears in the sequence (N 1 , . . . , N i ) then Distributor simply chooses δ i = γ 0 . Otherwise, let j < i be the biggest number such that N j = N i . Distributor finds q such that δ j = γ q and chooses δ i to be the next one in Γ, i.e. δ i = γ ((q+1) mod r) .
Suppose the game end after round l. Consider the possible values of gds (π, γ) at the end of the game. For a fixed participant π let γ min , γ max be such that gds (π, γ min ) = min γ∈Γ gds (π, γ) and gds (π, γ max ) = max γ∈Γ gds (π, γ). Now suppose that a subset N ⊆ Π occurs s times in the sequence (N 1 , . . . , N l ). Observe that Distributor responded to those s occurrences of the subset N in a round robin manner, and γ j was chosen to be the response exactly s−j r times. This means that subset N contributes at most 1 to the value of the difference gds (π, γ max ) − gds (π, γ min ). This, the electronic journal of combinatorics 18 (2011), #P140
together with the fact that gds (π, γ max ) is not smaller than the average value k |Γ| of gds (π, γ), allows us to state
Since this holds for all participants π ∈ Π, Distributor has won.
From the results of [1] one can infer that in the off-line version of Balanced Distribution Game (i.e. when all sets N i are given to Distributor in a single batch) Distributor has a winning strategy even for ε = 0. In the BD-games with |Π| = 1 or |Γ| = 1 Distributor has an obvious winning strategy. In the BD-games with ε = 0 and |Π| = 2 a winning strategy for Distributor also exists:
• set k = |Γ| (each of the two participants will receive one good of every commodity),
• before the i-th round renumber Π to {π 1 , π 2 } = Π so that occ (π 1 ) occ (π 2 ),
• if π 1 ∈ N i , set δ i to be one of the goods not received yet by π 1 ,
• if π 1 / ∈ N i , set δ i to be one of the goods received by π 1 but not by π 2 .
The next lemma shows that the situation changes dramatically in the remaining cases.
Lemma 3. In BD-games with fixed ε = 0, |Π| 3 and |Γ| 2, Nominator has a winning strategy.
Proof. Assume that ε, Π and Γ are given as in the Lemma and that Distributor has already set k. If k = 1 Nominator plays N 1 = Π and wins instantly. We will assume k 2 for the rest of the proof. We call a configuration of the two participants (π 1 , π 2 ) insecure if occ (π 1 ) = occ (π 2 ) and gds (π 1 , γ 1 ) = gds (π 2 , γ 1 ) for some γ 1 . Observe that if at any point of the game Nominator finds an insecure configuration (π 1 , π 2 ) then he can win the game using the following approach. Nominator simply plays k − occ (π 1 ) times the subset {π 1 , π 2 }. No matter how Distributor responds, occ (π 1 ) = occ (π 2 ) = k and gds (π 1 , γ 1 ) = gds (π 2 , γ 1 ) still holds. Without loss of generality this allows us to assume that gds (π 1 , γ 1 ) = k |Γ| . This means that the goods given to π 1 are not in balance, and therefore gds (π 1 , γ) < k |Γ| for some γ ∈ Γ. Nominator still needs to finish the game and he will do so by playing singletons N i = {π} as long as there exists a π with occ (π) < k. Distributor loses the game, for he failed to balance the distribution of the goods received by π 1 . Now we show how Nominator can win the game. He starts with fixing three different participants π 1 , π 2 , π 3 ∈ Π. In round 1 Nominator plays N 1 = {π 1 , π 2 } and after Distributor's response δ 1 he plays N 2 = {π 1 , π 3 }. Distributor must respond with δ 2 = δ 1 , for otherwise the configuration (π 2 , π 3 ) becomes insecure. Nominator continues with N 3 = {π 2 } the electronic journal of combinatorics 18 (2011), #P140 forcing δ 3 = δ 1 . Indeed, for δ 3 = δ 2 = δ 1 the configuration (π 1 , π 2 ) is insecure. The following table presents the state of the game during the first rounds:
Nominator may continue alternating the moves {π 1 , π 3 } and {π 2 } and Distributor must always respond with the same δ 1 or create an insecure configuration. When Nominator can no longer continue the simple alternations, the situation is as follows:
Again Nominator can finish the game by playing singletons as long as needed. He wins, for the distributions of the goods owned by the participants π 1 and π 2 are as far from being balanced as one can get -all of the goods received by them are of the single commodity δ 1 . This is unacceptable for |Γ| 2.
On-line choice ratio
Now that we understand the basic mechanics of the BD-game, we will use this knowledge to prove the main results concerning the on-line choice ratio ch OL F (G). Theorem 4. For any graph G we have ch
Proof. Recall that inequality ch OL F (G) χ F (G) follows immediately from the definitions. We are going to prove the converse inequality by reducing the PC-game to the BD-game. For the graph G = (V, E), let L a be the list assignment with L a (v) = {0, . . . , a − 1} for all v ∈ V . Fact 1 supplies us with a, b such that χ F (G) = (1 + τ ). This will allow us to conclude that ch
To find a ′ and b ′ and construct a strategy for Mrs. Correct, we are going to use Distributor's winning strategy in the Balanced Distribution Game and the colouring Φ. We may imagine that Mrs. Correct plays simultaneously as Nominator in the BD-game (with Π = V , Γ = {0, . . . , a − 1} and ε = τ 1+τ ), against Distributor using a winning strategy. She translates P i played by Mr. Paint to N i := P i for the BD-game, and then takes Distributor's response δ i to calculate her response in the PC-game. The idea is that, at the end of the game, for each vertex v, Distributor partitioned the occurrences of v in the sets P i into a different types of about equal size. of the occurrences will be included in her responses. In detail, we proceed as follows.
By Lemma 2 we know that Distributor has a winning strategy in the BD-game with Π = V , Γ = {0, . . . , a − 1} and ε = τ 1+τ
. In particular this strategy tells Distributor the value of k with which to respond initially. Now we are ready to set a ′ = k and
k and start the PC-game. Note that
In the i-th round, Mr. Paint presents a set P i . In order to find her response C i ⊆ P i , Mrs. Correct plays N i = P i as Nominator in the BD-game. Distributor responds with δ i ∈ {0, . . . , a − 1}. Mrs. Correct includes vertex v into her response C i ⊆ P i if and only if δ i is one of the colours assigned to v in the colouring Φ, i.e.
This is a valid response in the PC-game, as {v ∈ V : δ i ∈ Φ(v)} is an independent set.
The PC-game ends when each list contains a ′ = k colours. This means that every participant was nominated exactly k times and the BD-game finishes in the very same moment. Distributor wins the BD-game, thus gds (v, d) (1 − ε) 
The next theorem shows that, in contrast to Fact 1, the infimum in the definition of the on-line choice ratio is not always reached.
Theorem 5. There is an infinite family G of graphs, such that for every graph G ∈ G we have ch
Proof. For the finite sets Π, Γ with |Π| 3 and |Γ| 2 let the graph G Π,Γ = (V, E) be a complete |Γ|-partite graph with |Π| vertices in each partite set. For the further reference we simply put:
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The graph G Π,Γ is obviously (|Γ| , 1)-colourable -one can assign a different colour to each partite set Π × {γ}. Observe that graph G contains |Γ|-cliques, for example {π} × Γ for any π ∈ Π. Assume that G is (a, b)-colourable. Colours assigned to the vertices of any |Γ|-clique need to be different, thus a b · |Γ| holds. It follows that χ F (G) = χ(G) = |Γ|. Theorem 4 allows us to conclude that ch OL F (G) = |Γ|. Put G = {G Π,Γ : |Π| 3 ∧ |Γ| 2}. Now suppose, to the contrary, that some G Π,Γ ∈ G is on-line (a, b)-choosable for some a, b with a b = |Γ|. This means that Mrs. Correct has a winning strategy S in the PC-game on the graph G Π,Γ with the parameters a and b.
Leading to a contradiction with Lemma 3 we will find a winning strategy for Distributor in the BD-game with Π, Γ and ε = 0 using a reduction to the PC-game on the graph G Π,Γ so that strategy S can be used.
The construction of Distributor's strategy is as follows. In the preparatory phase of the BD-game Distributor responds with k = a. In the i-th round, when Nominator nominates N i ⊆ Π, Distributor plays P i = N i × Γ in the PC-game as Mr. Paint. Strategy S tells Mrs. Correct to respond with an independent set C i ⊆ P i . Set C i contains vertices from at most one copy Π × {γ} of Π. Distributor sets his response δ i in the BD-game to be γ such that C i ⊆ N i × {γ}. Observe that the participant π receives one good of the commodity γ each time the vertex (π, γ) is present in the set C i .
The BD-game ends when each participant was nominated a times. This means that each vertex in G has a list of length a attached to it. The PC-game is over and Mrs. Correct has won using the strategy S, so each vertex is present in at least b of the sets C i . This means that gds (π, γ) b = k |Γ| , and that Distributor has managed to construct a perfectly balanced distribution. This contradiction with Lemma 3 ends the proof.
